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LIMITED LEVERAGE: FEDERAL REMEDIES AND POLICING 
REFORM 
RACHEL HARMON* 
INTRODUCTION 
Remedies for police misconduct have multiple purposes, including 
punishing perpetrators, making victims whole, and forcing departments to 
comply with constitutional rules. For those interested in reducing police 
misconduct, the primary measure of federal legal remedies for police 
misconduct is whether they deter future bad acts. Other speakers at Saint Louis 
University Public Law Review’s Fall 2012 Symposium described good news 
about federal remedies and future police misconduct despite Supreme Court 
restrictions on the application of the exclusionary rule. For example, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 suits against municipalities for officer misconduct are imposing 
significant costs on cities that permit officers to violate suspects’ rights; federal 
criminal prosecutions against police officers have reached record highs this 
year; and the Obama Administration has reinvigorated the use of 42 U.S.C. § 
14141 to secure institutional reform in departments with a pattern and practice 
of violating constitutional rights. These uses of federal remedies likely will 
deter some officers from committing misconduct and encourage some 
departments to prevent it. Unfortunately, this good news is overshadowed by 
the persistent realities of federal remedies for misconduct. 
Here is the bad news: with respect to deterring police misconduct, federal 
remedies are almost as good as they are ever going to get. The remedies 
probably reduce police misconduct some now, and they can be tailored to 
induce somewhat more reform. However, legal, structural, and practical limits 
on the capacity of existing federal remedies to deter misconduct ensure that 
even with improvements they can be only marginally more effective. 
Federal remedies for police misconduct, and most other remedies for 
misconduct, promote change by making misconduct costly for police 
departments and municipalities. Improving federal remedies would encourage 
some additional departments to seek the positive expected return on reform 
measures likely to reduce misconduct. But existing federal remedies all focus 
 
* Sullivan & Cromwell Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I am grateful to 
Robert Newman and Sarah Stewart for their helpful comments and to Adam Fleisher for his 
excellent research assistance. 
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on either increasing the cost of misconduct or reducing its benefits. The 
problem is that even if existing federal remedies are altered to maximize 
deterrence, they cannot be employed to impose a substantially greater price for 
misconduct because, by their nature, the costs imposed by existing remedies 
are relatively fixed. As a result, federal remedies for misconduct will never 
prevent bad policing much more than they do now. 
While existing federal remedies are constrained in their capacity to deter 
much more than they do, there are alternative means of inspiring reform. 
Strengthened state and local remedies, and new federal remedies, could 
supplement existing federal remedies and incentivize additional reform—at 
least to some degree. However, because these remedies suffer from some of 
the same structural limits as existing federal remedies, and because expanding 
them is politically unlikely, it may be time for those interested in deterring 
misconduct further to consider a different approach. Instead, federal actors 
may foster reform by lowering the costs of adopting policies that prevent 
misconduct and by shoring up rewards for police chiefs and departments that 
pursue reform. Some Justice Department programs already likely modify the 
expected costs of reform, but the Department of Justice’s undertakings appear 
both piecemeal and limited. Although discouraging police misconduct by 
reducing the costs of reform and increasing its benefits poses some risks, the 
limits of existing federal remedies suggest these risks may be well worth 
taking. 
I.  THE CALCULUS OF POLICE REFORM 
While individual police officers commit misconduct, preventing police 
misconduct often requires institutional change, and institutional change 
requires investment and commitment from departmental leadership. Federal 
remedies both increase the expected costs of engaging in misconduct for police 
officers, and perhaps more importantly, increase the expected costs of 
permitting misconduct for police departments. As a result, federal remedies 
have long been viewed as important to deter misconduct by individual officers 
and to incentivize departmental reforms necessary to reduce unconstitutional 
conduct.1 
Police officers violate constitutional rights because they receive a benefit 
or avoid a cost by doing so. An officer might use too much force to preempt a 
suspect’s injurious resistance, to satisfy a taste for revenge, because he has a 
mistaken understanding of the law governing force, or because it is quicker to 
 
 1. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave & Frank J. Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge’s 
Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 987 (1964) 
(describing significance of exclusionary rule in deterring police misconduct); Caleb Foote, Tort 
Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493, 793 (1955) 
(discussing advantages of federal civil remedies over state remedies to deter police misconduct). 
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gain compliance by force than to persuade a suspect to cooperate.2 A rational 
officer will learn and comply with the law governing force when the expected 
costs of doing so are less than the net expected cost of misconduct. Legal 
remedies are likely to reduce police misconduct when they raise the costs of 
misconduct relative to restraint. 
Scholars and others interested in reducing police misconduct emphasize 
the significance of institutional change rather than simply focusing on 
individual restraint, because police departments strongly shape individual 
officer capacity and motivation to comply with constitutional norms.3 With 
respect to capacity, police departments determine much of the preparation and 
guidance officers receive beyond the minimum amounts dictated by state law.4 
Some departments have their own police academies or provide supplemental 
training for officers after basic training, including supervision by field training 
officers.5 Many departments provide annual in-service training beyond state 
mandates.6 All departments provide direct supervision of officers by sergeants 
and other departmental leadership.7 This training and supervision—along with 
formal departmental policies—gives officers the knowledge and skills 
necessary to comply with constitutional requirements. If officers know the law, 
learn to evaluate the situations they face, and are well-trained in the 
communication, physical, and practical skills necessary to address those 
situations, the costs of lawful policing for officers is lowered. 
With respect to motivation, departments determine many of the 
professional and financial incentives of the police officer’s work. If a 
 
 2. See Rachel A. Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 
1163 (2008). 
 3. See, e.g., Barbara Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 456, 493–94 (2004); CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMM., MISSED OPPORTUNITIES, 
SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES: FINAL REPORT OF THE CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE 7–9 (2010) 
(advocating departmental changes to reduce confrontations between citizens and police officers 
like the 2009 arrest of Henry Louis Gates, Jr. by an officer of the Cambridge, Massachusetts 
Police Department). 
 4. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 806 (2012) 
(citing statistics from MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMIES, 2002, at 10 (2005), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/slleta02.pdf. 
 5. See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL 
POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 12 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
lpd07.pdf. 
 6. See HICKMAN, supra note 4, at iv. 
 7. Very small departments may provide less direct supervision of officers, but even in small 
departments there is a chief of police who monitors the work of other officers, sometimes as a 
matter of state law. See e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2–1701 (mandating that locally-organized 
police forces have a chief of police who serves as the chief law enforcement officer of the 
locality). 
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department rewards arrests with promotions, officers will be motivated to 
make more arrests, even those with a weak legal justification.8 If a department 
disciplines illegal searches, officers will have good reason to engage in fewer 
of them. Less formally, departmental leadership may foster respect for officers 
engaged in aggressive policing even as official policies discourage 
unconstitutional actions:9 if sergeants treat officers who disdain formal rules as 
successful, other officers learn to value those qualities and young officers learn 
to emulate them.10 
Institutional police practices are in turn the product of departmental 
leadership and the local political process. Mayors, city managers, and council 
members hire and fire police chiefs, determine departmental budgets, and 
oversee police activities—and therefore influence departmental policies.11 A 
mayor might pressure a chief to police more assertively when voters complain 
about crime, or threaten to impose external citizen review of police 
disciplinary determinations in light of community concerns about abuse. 
Moreover, peer groups, communities, and officer associations impose less 
tangible costs and benefits on police leadership and officers for both 
misconduct and reform. 
While the factors that shape departmental policies and practices are 
complex, deterrence theory suggests that a police department will adopt 
remedial measures when doing so is a cost-effective means of lowering the net 
costs of police misconduct or increasing the net benefits of protecting civil 
rights.12 Legal remedies imposed for misconduct are one significant way of 
making reform cost-effective for departments. Among those legal remedies are 
four significant federal remedial mechanisms that can raise the expected costs 
of misconduct for departments, and therefore incentivize reform and deter civil 
rights violations: the federal exclusionary rule, which prohibits the use of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in criminal trials; federal criminal 
prosecutions for willful constitutional civil rights violations; private federal 
civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations; and civil suits 
by the U.S. Department of Justice under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 for equitable relief 
against police departments to remedy patterns and practices of constitutional 
violations. 
 
 8. See Armacost, supra note 3, at 495, 498–99. 
 9. See id. at 498–499, 518–520. 
 10. See id. at 516, 519. 
 11. Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 46 (2009). 
 12. Id. at 22–23. 
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By many accounts, these remedies increase the relative expected costs of 
unconstitutional police conduct, at least to some degree.13 Despite doctrinal 
changes that limit the exclusionary rule, it continues to affect individual cases 
and it remains part of the internal culture of police departments, in which 
knowing and adhering to Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment law is part of 
what it means to be a police officer. The rule therefore encourages departments 
to foster compliance with constitutional norms.14 Similarly, while criminal 
prosecutions of police officers are relatively rare, they are well publicized and 
have serious sanctions.15 Therefore, they may deter some officers from 
engaging in or lying about violent misconduct.16 Civil suits almost certainly 
influence some police chiefs to adopt reform measures.17 Small municipalities, 
for example, where even relatively small civil judgments are likely to be well 
known and costly, are likely to take steps to avoid or reduce future 
judgments.18 Finally, investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice for 
Section 14141 violations almost inevitably lead local police departments to 
agree to substantial and expensive reform rather than risk a lawsuit.19 In each 
case, the federal remedy increases the cost or decreases the benefits of 
engaging in misconduct relative to adopting remedial measures and, therefore, 
encourages some departments to change. 
 
 13. See, e.g., David H. Kaye, Unraveling the Exclusionary Rule: From Leon to Herring to 
Robinson—And Back?, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 207, 209 (2011) (on exclusionary rule); 
Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1913, 1923 (2007) (on civil suits); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural 
Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1420 (2007) (on injunctive relief). 
 14. See Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1372–74 (2008) (describing changes to police departments resulting from the 
exclusionary rule); SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 30 (2005) 
(describing the effects on policing of the Warren Court’s key rulings, including the exclusionary 
rule). 
 15. See, e.g., infra note 34. 
 16. Contra Harmon, supra note 11, at 9 (stating criminal prosecutions are too rare to deter 
police misconduct); Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. 
Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 20 
(2003) (concluding successful criminal prosecutions do not appear to deter future police 
misconduct). 
 17. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1788 (1991). It is hard to imagine how else a 
cottage industry could exist providing risk management consulting to police departments. See, 
e.g., CIRMAT, INC., http://www.sashley.com/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (describing risk 
management services); LAAW INTERNATIONAL, INC., http://www.laaw.com/lerm.htm (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2013). Contra NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN 
POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 279 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) (“[I]t is well 
recognized that civil suits offer little deterrence to excessive police force.”). 
 18. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 280. 
 19. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 16. 
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Although federal remedies seem to work to some degree, few observers 
believe these remedies have solved the problem of police misconduct.20 While 
data on police conduct and misconduct is difficult to obtain,21 most participants 
in Saint Louis University Public Law Review’s Symposium, and elsewhere, 
take for granted the need for additional efforts by police departments to 
promote civil rights through departmental reform because civil rights 
violations continue to occur. In order to deter more misconduct and facilitate 
further reform, legal scholars and advocates have proposed innumerable ways 
to make federal remedies more effective. They advocate legal and policy 
changes designed to enable federal remedies to be used more efficiently, more 
often, or at greater cost to officers and departments.22 Although some of these 
proposals might be cost-effective means of making federal remedies somewhat 
better at incentivizing departmental reform, efforts to improve federal remedies 
will face inevitable limits. 
Departments have significant power over officer conduct, and many kinds 
of misconduct require departmental participation to prevent. But better 
policies, training, ongoing supervision, and disciplinary mechanisms are 
expensive for departments to adopt.23 Reducing misconduct much further 
probably requires improved accountability in many departments that now do 
not find key reforms worth the costs. To alter the reform calculus for a large 
number of departments, federal remedies would have to increase the expected 
costs of misconduct significantly. Unfortunately for those interested in using 
federal remedies to affect reform, this cannot be done. 
Federal legal remedies for misconduct largely change the relative costs of 
misconduct and reform by raising the expected costs of engaging in civil rights 
violations, making lawful policing and the remedial measures necessary to 
achieve it comparatively more attractive. In calculating the expected cost of 
misconduct, officers and departments with adequate information will consider 
both the risk that allowing misconduct will result in imposition of a federal 
 
 20. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 14, at 31–35; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, 
at 275–81. 
 21. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 5. 
 22. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of 
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1082–85 (2010) 
(recommending polices to make civil rights damages actions a more efficient deterrent); Myriam 
E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the 
Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (2000) (advocating statutory changes to 
improve Section 14141); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). 
 23. See, e.g., Seattle Police Call DOJ’s Reform Proposals Wildly Unrealistic, SEATTLE 
TIMES (May 15, 2012, 7:54 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2018215185_ 
doj16m.html (describing significant expenses associated with changing policies, adding training, 
improving supervision, and ensuring the implementation of such reforms through outside 
monitoring). 
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judgment and the cost of that judgment if it is imposed. Thus, to further 
increase the expected cost of misconduct, federal remedies must impose costs 
on officers and departments either more harshly or more often, or make the 
translation of costs into incentives for the relevant actors more effectual. 
Although federal remedies can be changed to marginally increase the 
incentives to reform, federal remedies will never inspire substantially more 
reform than they do now because neither legal nor policy reforms will notably 
change the cost of federal remedies, the probability they will be imposed, or 
their efficiency at driving reform. 
II.  THE LIMITED COSTS OF FEDERAL REMEDIES 
First, none of the federal remedies can be changed to increase notably its 
cost to officers and departments when it is employed. The exclusionary rule, 
for example, reduces the expected value of misconduct by depriving officers 
and departments of the evidentiary value of illegal searches and seizures.24 As 
a deterrent, the rule suffers well-known structural limits: excluding evidence 
cannot influence officers or departments uninterested in using illegally 
obtained evidence in a criminal prosecution, and it cannot discourage 
unconstitutional conduct that is unlikely to produce evidence.25 Nevertheless, 
federal courts do not presently use the exclusionary rule to its fullest possible 
extent. In the name of reducing the societal costs of the exclusionary rule 
without undermining its benefits, the Supreme Court permits courts to admit 
illegally obtained evidence in grand jury proceedings, preliminary hearings, 
and sentencing hearings, for example; as well as collateral non-criminal 
proceedings, such as tax proceedings, deportation hearings, and parole 
hearings.26 As a result, even when a court finds that an officer discovered 
evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, that the 
evidence must be excluded from the prosecution’s case-in-chief in a criminal 
case, illegally obtained evidence may retain value for government actors. 
Changes to the federal exclusionary rule that would further minimize the 
evidentiary value for officers and departments of illegally obtained evidence 
are extremely unlikely in light of recent judicial skepticism about whether the 
 
 24. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“The [exclusionary] rule is 
calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to 
disregard it.”). 
 25. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1968). 
 26. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (deportation hearings); United 
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 457 (1976) (tax proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338, 354 (1974) (grand jury proceedings); Penn. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 
357, 369 (1998) (parole hearings); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 482 (1958) 
(preliminary hearings); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (sentencing). 
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rule is worth the cost of allowing guilty individuals to evade justice.27 Even 
assuming, however, that this were not so, and that broadening the scope of the 
rule to further decrease the benefits of illegally obtaining evidence would be a 
cost-effective means of discouraging misconduct, such a project could only 
have a limited effect on the rule’s power to deter. The primary cost of 
evidentiary exclusion for a police department or local municipality is fixed—it 
can do no more than deprive a government of the value of the excluded 
evidence. No change to the exclusionary rule can dramatically increase the 
costs of the rule for officers and departments. All adjustments can do is to 
reduce somewhat the residual value of illegally obtained evidence. Such 
changes to the exclusionary rule may encourage a few additional departments 
to adopt remedial measures, but they are unlikely to drive significant national 
reform. 
In addition to depriving the government of the evidentiary benefit of 
misconduct, the exclusionary rule can impose secondary political and 
reputational costs on the government actors held responsible for the 
misconduct and the evidentiary exclusion that follows, increasing the rule’s 
influence on the expected costs of misconduct. Thus, when an illegal search by 
the police weakens a newsworthy criminal prosecution, the district attorney, 
police chief, and mayor may feel the sting of critical popular sentiment.28 
While these political costs are not fixed in the same way as the underlying cost 
of the evidentiary exclusion, they are likely to be closely correlated with the 
consequences of evidentiary exclusion over time. It is therefore difficult to 
imagine that strategies to increase these intangible costs could be used to 
expand significantly the impact of the exclusionary rule. Thus, neither legal 
changes nor strategic use of the exclusionary rule can be expected to alter 
considerably the expected costs of misconduct—and, therefore, the behavior of 
departments. 
 
 27. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 695, 704 (2009) (expanding the good faith 
exception because it neither appreciably deters constitutional violations, nor outweighs its costs in 
the context of isolated negligent police mistakes attenuated from the search); Hudson v. 
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in part because the 
costs outweigh its deterrence value for knock-and-announce violations). 
 28. See, e.g., Buffy Spencer, Judge Throws Out $2 Million Worth of Drugs, Gun as 
Evidence in Case Against Springfield Man, THE REPUBLICAN NEWSROOM (Feb. 3, 2009), 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2177394/posts?page=60; Judge Upheld Law, Not 
Police Interests, in Barkyoumb Case, THE REPUBLICAN (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.masslive.com/ 
opinion/index.ssf/2009/10/judge_upheld_law_not_police_in.html (citing with approval statement 
by judge that misuse of evidence is “corrupt . . . absolutely corrupt” and suggesting that the 
message  needed to be heard by the district attorney and police chief); Jesse McKinley, Dozens of 
Cases to Be Dropped in San Francisco Police Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2011, at A16 (noting 
that San Francisco District Attorney’s office dropped “dozens of drug and robbery cases” after 
revelations that undercover officers allegedly committed perjury and conducted illegal searches). 
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Federal criminal prosecutions deter misconduct by imposing costs in the 
form of imprisonment, fines, and the stigma of criminal conviction on officers 
and supervisors who willfully deprive victims of their constitutional rights.29 
Criminal prosecutions are likely better at deterring individual officer 
misconduct than encouraging departmental reform. Unlike other federal 
remedies, the individuals who commit the misconduct suffer most of the costs 
of criminal prosecutions. Moreover, federal civil rights criminal cases target 
willful conduct, that is, conduct that intentionally deprives the victim of a 
constitutional right.30 As a result, although departments can do much to create 
a culture that encourages compliance with the law, the conduct targeted by 
criminal prosecutions often occurs in spite of policies or training—and officers 
can avoid such intentional acts without costly departmental action. 
Already, defendants convicted of violating federal criminal civil rights 
statutes face very high penalties. An officer can receive the death penalty for 
civil rights violations that kill, life imprisonment for violations involving 
aggravated sexual abuse or kidnapping, and up to ten years imprisonment for 
using a dangerous weapon or causing bodily injury.31 Even a defendant 
convicted of depriving someone of their civil rights without a weapon or 
causing injury faces a felony conviction and potential imprisonment.32 While 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines do not recommend maximal sentences 
in most civil rights cases, the guidelines do authorize significant sentences,33 
and those convicted of federal civil rights crimes are frequently sentenced to 
substantial terms of imprisonment.34 
 
 29. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006). 
 30. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). See also, e.g., CRIMINAL PATTERN 
JURY INSTRUCTION COMM. OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, CRIMINAL 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.17 (2011); CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION COMM. OF 
THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
§ 2.18. 
 31. See 18 U.S.C. § 242. Although the statute authorizes death for violations including 
kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated 
sexual abuse or an attempt to kill, constitutional restrictions on the application of the death 
penalty limit to life imprisonment the legal sentence for violations that do not result in a death. 
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (prohibiting application of the death penalty 
to defendant convicted of aggravated rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) 
(prohibiting application of the death penalty to defendant convicted of raping an adult woman). 
 32. See 18 U.S.C. § 242. 
 33. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2H1.1 (2011) (setting base level for 
offenses involving individual rights). 
 34. See e.g., Lawrence Buser, Memphis Ex-Cop’s Drug-Robbery Convictions, Life-Plus 
Sentence Upheld, The Commercial Appeal, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Oct. 24, 2011, 1:47 PM), 
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2011/oct/24/memphis-ex-cops-drug-robbery-convic 
tions-life-plus/; Laura Maggi & Brendan McCarthy, Two Former NOPD Officers Receive Stiff 
Sentences in Henry Glover Case, Times-Picayune, (Mar. 31, 2011, 1:41 PM), http://www.nola. 
com/crime/index.ssf/2011/03/two_former_nopd_officers_recei.html; Kristen Gosling, Former 
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Raising the costs of federal prosecution to deter more misconduct would 
require raising the penalties imposed when an officer is convicted under 
federal criminal law. There are few absolute bounds on criminal punishment 
beyond human mortality and Eighth Amendment limits on the application of 
the death penalty, and, more recently, life without parole.35 To deter more 
officers from misconduct, Congress could raise the maximum penalty for all 
criminal civil rights violations to life imprisonment or impose new mandatory 
minimum sentences of imprisonment for violations. However, even assuming 
that such actions would be a cost-effective means of deterring future 
constitutional violations, criminal sentences are graduated for a purpose: to 
achieve marginal deterrence.36 If maximal penalties were imposed for minor 
violations, officers who beat a suspect would be given incentive to kill him or 
nearby witnesses to lower the risk of being caught without raising the potential 
penalty for the crime. Raising the penalties for minor offenses also risks 
imposing punishments on criminal defendants far beyond their just deserts in 
the name of deterrence—a result many would find unjust. 
This is not to say that criminal prosecutions could or should not be used to 
raise the costs of misconduct above present levels. One might argue that some 
civil rights criminal violations should be sentenced more harshly than present 
law permits in order to serve justice and deter future illegal conduct. A police 
officer who plants evidence on an innocent suspect or who—enabled by his 
uniform, gun, and arrest power rather than the threat of force—pressures 
someone to have sex against her will might reasonably receive more than the 
one year imprisonment now authorized. But in light of the already very high 
costs of federal criminal conviction, and the difficulties of raising those costs 
across the board, changes to federal criminal statutes to address such matters 
are unlikely to result in criminal punishments for constitutional violations that 
are considerably more serious than present law achieves. 
Although much of the deterrent potential of criminal convictions comes 
from influencing individual officers, because police chiefs and political actors 
 
Uplands Park Officer Leon Pullen Sentenced to 25 Years, KSDK (Jan. 28, 2011, 2:46 PM), 
http://www.ksdk.com/rss/article/241087/3/Former-Uplands-Park-police-officer-sentenced. 
 35. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407; Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 36. One classic statement of the principle of marginal deterrence comes from Jeremy 
Bentham. Of the Proportion Between Punishments and Offences, in COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 168 
(J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996). Bentham notes that one purpose of punishment is “to 
induce a man to choose always the least mischievous of two offenses; therefore where two 
offenses come in competition, the punishment for the greater offense must be sufficient to induce 
a man to prefer the less.” Id. For a more contemporary analysis, see Steven Shavell, A Note on 
Marginal Deterrence, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 345 (1992) (engaging in an economic analysis 
of marginal deterrence with respect to fines). 
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can pay reputational and political costs for serious criminal conduct that occurs 
under their watch, criminal prosecutions may also encourage departments to 
engage in remedial measures to prevent misconduct.37 As in the use of the 
exclusionary rule, increasing the costs of criminal prosecutions for those who 
govern police departments and municipalities could lead to some reform. 
Recently, for example, the Department of Justice has coordinated some 
criminal prosecutions with civil investigations into widespread department 
misconduct, increasing publicity for the criminal convictions and highlighting 
for the public the systemic causes of criminal police conduct.38 This strategic 
use of criminal prosecutions may increase the secondary costs of criminal 
prosecutions and therefore their power to drive reform. But such increases may 
be marginal, since prosecutions by the Department of Justice have long 
 
 37. See, e.g., Tina Daunt & Henry Weinstein, Officials Renew Call for Outside Probe of 
LAPD, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at A1 (“The Rampart situation—in which officers allegedly 
conspired to put innocent people in jail and to cover up unjustified shootings and beatings—
warrants a U.S. criminal civil rights investigation because there is evidence of ‘a widespread 
pattern and practice of federal civil rights violations’ by Rampart officers, said lawyer Merrick J. 
Bobb, an expert on police misconduct who advises the Board of Supervisors and the Los Angeles 
Police Commission.”); John Discepelo, Report on Officer-Involved Shootings Says SPD Culture 
Must Change, KOMO NEWS (Dec. 22, 2011, 6:23 AM), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/ 
New-report—136052748.html (noting a Citizens Report on police shootings in Seattle “says the 
culture within the police department has to change, specifically in how officers communicate with 
the public”); Gabriel Baird & Henry J. Gomez, Police Get Renewed Scrutiny from Feds: 
Questions Raised in Other Cities Mirror Issues Here, The PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, OH), June 
26, 2011, at A1 (suggesting that investigations into police brutality by a handful of officers could 
lead to investigation of department-wide problems). 
 38. See Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez Speaks at the East Haven Police 
Department Indictment Announcement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.jus 
tice.gov/crt/opa/pr/speeches/2012/crt-speech-120124.html (announcing criminal indictment of 
East Haven officers and noting that “[c]riminal prosecutions are not the only tool we have to 
combat police misconduct . . . [and] the Civil Rights Division [recently] completed a civil 
investigation of the East Haven Police Department using our authority under federal civil rights 
laws to investigate patterns or practices of police misconduct”); Assistant Attorney General 
Thomas E. Perez of the Civil Rights Division Speaks at the Portland, Oregon, Police Bureau 
Press Conference, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 8, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/opa/pr/ 
speeches/2011/crt-speech-110608.html (linking criminal investigation of police shooting and civil 
pattern or practice investigation of the Portland Police Bureau); Assistant Attorney General 
Thomas E. Perez Speaks at the Miami Police Department Investigation Announcement, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/opa/pr/speeches/2011/crt-speech-
111117.html (making public pattern or practice investigation and noting that “most” of the 
matters related to the civil investigation were “being evaluated separately with regard to potential 
criminal liability by the state or by the Justice Department”). See also Oversight Hearing on the 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 31 (2011) (statement of Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Civil Rights Div.) (“Following the spate of criminal cases involving NOPD officers, the Division 
launched a civil pattern or practice investigation of the New Orleans Police Department.”). 
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received significant media attention.39 Existing potential reform efforts likely 
already reflect much of the potential secondary costs of criminal prosecutions. 
One might respond that, more than the exclusionary rule, criminal 
convictions have complex and difficult to discern effects on the incentives of 
departmental actors who lead reform. While criminal convictions can lead to 
reputational costs that encourage remedial measures, federal criminal 
convictions of officers in a department also may sometimes lower the costs of 
misconduct for police chiefs and politicians by attributing bad acts to 
individuals and implicitly relieving departmental leadership of blame.40 If the 
Department of Justice’s recent efforts to connect criminal prosecutions and 
departmental deficiencies inhibit that phenomenon, they could raise the 
secondary costs of criminal convictions for department and municipal leaders. 
But even so, it seems unlikely that the Department of Justice’s efforts can 
markedly change the expected value of reform for troubled departments 
because criminal sanctions inherently emphasize individual responsibility. As a 
result, neither the primary costs of criminal convictions on individual 
defendants nor the secondary effects of those convictions on others is likely to 
alter significantly the calculus governing institutional reform in American 
police departments. 
Section 14141 permits the Department of Justice to sue police departments 
for injunctive relief to stop patterns and practices of constitutional violations 
by police officers.41 Although Section 14141 enforcement compels 
departments to adopt remedial measures to prevent further misconduct, the 
statute is expensive for the Department of Justice to employ. There are more 
than fifteen thousand local police departments and sheriff’s offices in the 
United States.42 Assuming even a small minority of them is engaged in a 
pattern or practice of constitutional violations, the Department of Justice 
cannot achieve national reform by suing every department with a pattern of 
widespread constitutional violations.43 Nevertheless, as I have argued 
elsewhere, because Section 14141 investigations and suits are costly to police 
departments as well as the Department of Justice, the threat of a Section 14141 
investigation and subsequent suit could—like the threat of other federal 
remedies—raise the expected costs of misconduct and induce proactive reform 
 
 39. See e.g., Daunt & Weinstein, supra note 37; Robert Reinhold, Verdict in Los Angeles; 
Calm Relief Where Rage Once Ruled, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at A1; John M. Crewdson, Ex-
Officer Indicted in Miami Racial Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1980, at A14. 
 40. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 9; Armacost, supra note 3, at 457–58. 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006). 
 42. See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 (2011), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf. 
 43. Harmon, supra note 11, at 21–22. 
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in police departments that are not investigated, in addition to those departments 
that are investigated.44 
Just as expanding the deterrence effect of other federal remedies requires 
increasing their expected costs for departments, exploiting the deterrence 
potential of Section 14141 requires increasing the expected costs of permitting 
a pattern or practice of constitutional violations for police departments. 
However, this goal cannot be achieved by raising the costs of Section 14141 
for each department that is investigated or sued since the statute authorizes 
only remedial measures and monitoring necessary to eliminate the illegality—
not damages or other non-remedial punishments. As a result, Section 14141 
cannot incentivize additional police departments by raising the costs of each 
investigation or suit under the statute.45 If Department of Justice suits for 
equitable relief are to deter misconduct more than they do now, they must do 
so by some other mechanism. 
Civil suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not face the inherent 
constraints of other federal remedies. Assuming that the political obstacles to 
changing Section 1983 could be overcome, Section 1983 could be used to 
impose significantly higher financial awards against officers and departments 
than it does now, through expanded punitive damages, for example.46 Despite 
this difference, it is highly unlikely that Section 1983 can be used to induce 
significant additional institutional reform by raising the costs of misconduct for 
departments. Instead, the example of civil damages reveals another obstacle to 
using remedial costs to deter more misconduct: federal remedies do not 
incentivize reform efficiently. Raising the cost imposed in a civil judgment 
 
 44. See id. at 22. In an earlier article, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing 
Reform, id., I contended that Section 14141 could not induce reform as it is currently enforced, 
even if resources devoted to enforcement increase dramatically. Instead, I argued that by 
concentrating Section 14141 investigations and suits on police departments with the worst indicia 
of misconduct and granting safe harbor for departments that adopt reform measures, Section 
14141 could be used to reduce misconduct cost-effectively. This Article contends that both the 
limits of Section 14141 in raising the costs of misconduct and some of the alternatives I proposed 
earlier apply not only to Section 14141—but to all federal remedies. 
 45. See id. at 24–25. 
 46. For example, although the Supreme Court has held that a municipality is immune from 
punitive damages under Section 1983 in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 
271 (1981), some have questioned the Court’s reasoning that punitive damages would not serve 
the purposes of Section 1983 and public policy. See, e.g., Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 
236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring). Such an argument could—at least in theory—
provide a basis for the Supreme Court to reevaluate the breadth of that immunity, something that 
existing Supreme Court doctrine might make possible. See Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. at 267 n. 
29 (suggesting that imposing punitive damages on taxpayers might not be unjust or unreasonable 
in “an extreme situation where the taxpayers are directly responsible for perpetrating an 
outrageous abuse of constitutional rights”). 
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often will not raise a department’s incentive to adopt remedial policies by the 
same measure. 
I argue above that criminal prosecutions provide only limited incentives to 
departments to reform because many of their costs accrue to individuals and 
many of the means of avoiding those costs are within individual control.47 This 
point illustrates an important form of remedial inefficiency: the costs imposed 
for misconduct do not accrue to the actors who most control institutional 
reform. A different version of this problem exists for civil damages actions. 
In civil rights actions, governments bear most of the costs of legal 
judgments. Because localities often indemnify police officers for civil damage 
awards by contract or statute, municipalities ultimately pay civil awards or buy 
insurance to pay for them.48 However, the costs borne by municipalities do not 
translate easily into political and financial costs for police chiefs and the 
political actors that shape their incentives and budgets, and those actors may 
face countervailing incentives to permit misconduct or to avoid adopting 
remedial measures.49 Many cities fail even to collect information about how 
much money is paid in civil judgments against police officers and about what 
practices trigger those judgments, making it much more difficult to implement 
measures tailored to reduce civil awards.50 Because police departments and 
their leaders are not easily forced to internalize the costs borne by the 
government, it is not surprising that many departments fail to adopt 
institutional reforms even after successful civil judgments impose significant 
costs for misconduct.51 Increasing civil penalties for misconduct, even 
substantially, may not increase costs on those who must be incentivized to 
adopt reforms commensurately, and therefore may not deter substantially more 
misconduct than existing civil judgments do.52 While some have advocated 
methods for increasing how efficiently civil judgments drive reform,53 the 
 
 47. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30. 
 48. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 279. 
 49. See Harmon, supra note 4, at 796 (arguing that government actors face countervailing 
pressures not to adopt many reform measures); PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN 
REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 125 (1983) (suggesting that “countervailing pressures” 
including the political environment and bureaucratic needs such as maintaining morale can 
compel officials to “tolerate low-level misconduct”). 
 50. See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1028 (drawing on documentary evidence and interviews 
to argue that most police departments “with more than one thousand sworn officers have no 
computerized system to track [civil] lawsuits brought against them”); see id. at 1030, 1040. 
 51. See Levinson, supra note 22, at 367 (arguing that because government agencies do not 
internalize costs, “awarding compensation to the victims of constitutional violations would not 
seem to have any deterrent effect on government”). 
 52. See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1030, 1081. 
 53. See, e.g., Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not 
Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587, 597 (2000) (suggesting that civil suits can change police behavior if 
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problem is structural rather than situational. Without significant and 
improbable changes in law or public policy, it is unlikely that civil suits can 
cost-effectively increase the costs of misconduct significantly enough to 
encourage much additional institutional reform.54 
III.  THE LIMITED FREQUENCY OF FEDERAL REMEDIES 
Federal remedies could still be used to change officer conduct on a large 
scale if departments and officers could be made to face significantly increased 
probability that they would bear the costs of acts of misconduct. However, 
federal remedies not only cannot be made to impose considerably higher costs 
for each act of misconduct they target, they also cannot practically be imposed 
dramatically more often than they are now. 
If evidence were excluded from criminal cases in a higher proportion of 
illegal searches, some further unconstitutional acts could be discouraged. But 
reaching that end is highly improbable, because for decades the Supreme Court 
has moved in precisely the opposite direction. The burgeoning good-faith 
exception, for example, restricts application of the exclusionary rule when 
police officers act in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant, statute, court 
decision, or clerical determination later found to be invalid, unconstitutional, or 
mistaken.55 As a result, the Court has expanded over time the number of 
unconstitutional acts for which evidence may be admitted at a subsequent 
 
“[a]fter the jury’s verdict as to liability and damages, the judge presiding over the civil rights 
case . . . determine[s] what portion of the judgment the city must indemnify” with the officer, 
depending on the gravity of the constitutional violations, liable for the rest); Jonathan Papik, 
Don’t Knock Them Until We Try Them: Civil Suits as a Remedy for Knock-and-Announce 
Violations After Hudson v. Michigan, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 417, 425 (2006) (suggesting 
that police misconduct should be deterred by punitive damages in addition to compensatory 
damages in civil suits); SCHUCK, supra note 49, at 82, 103 (suggesting that the burden of liability 
be shifted from individual officers to the government in order to “strengthen general deterrence 
by focusing at a better location the incentives” for compliance with rules by street-level officials). 
 54. For example, Joanna C. Schwartz has suggested that in contrast to the “dramatic 
suggestions offered by [other] scholars,” civil lawsuits can be made a substantially more effective 
deterrent by “comparatively small steps,” including new departmental efforts to gather and 
analyze information from lawsuits. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1030. By her own account, 
however, most of the departments in her study, which had adopted information gathering policies 
and programs had done so involuntarily. See id. at 1057. To accomplish information gathering, 
she proposes new federal legislation—a substantial suggestion by any measure; extremely 
laborious work by private citizens collecting and publicizing information; or local political 
changes, which, if there were sufficient incentive to motivate, likely would have occurred in 
additional jurisdictions without court order or Department of Justice suit. See id. at 1082–83. As 
this example suggests, even proposals intended to improve civil suits at modest cost face notable 
obstacles. 
 55. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (binding appellate precedent); 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (clerical determination); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 
340 (1987) (statute); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (warrant). 
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criminal trial. The independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines 
similarly restrict the frequency with which exclusion is applied.56 In total, the 
exclusionary rule applies to far fewer acts of misconduct than it once did, and 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning indicates that this trend will continue, if not 
strengthen. 
Federal criminal prosecutions for civil rights violations have increased 
under the Obama Administration.57 Mark Kappelhoff, the Chief of the Civil 
Rights Division, Criminal Section, noted in Saint Louis University Public Law 
Review’s Symposium that the Justice Department prosecuted a record number 
of police officers in 2010. Nevertheless, by his account, and by every other, 
federal criminal cases against police officers remain resource intensive, legally 
challenging, and factually difficult to prove.58 As a result, the Department of 
Justice prosecutes fewer than one hundred officers.59 To strengthen the 
deterrent effect of criminal prosecutions on the 644,000 sworn officers in local 
police departments and sheriff’s offices in the United States,60 that number 
would have to increase by orders of magnitude. Even without the evidentiary 
and legal obstacles such cases face, no realistic budgetary forecast could lead 
to that outcome.61 Criminal prosecutions may deter some misconduct now, and 
they remain important to promoting justice in individual cases and to 
demonstrating federal commitment to civil rights, but they cannot be used to 
change the future conduct of many police officers. 
Suits by the Department of Justice for injunctive relief are even more 
costly and difficult and, therefore, even less common. The Department of 
Justice’s efforts in Maricopa County, Arizona illustrate the problem. The 
Department launched an investigation into discriminatory policing practices by 
 
 56. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (expanding causation requirement 
for exclusionary rule); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (expanding independent 
source doctrine); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (recognizing broad inevitable discovery 
rule). 
 57. Peter J. Boyer & Peter Schweizer, Why Can’t Obama Bring Wall Street to Justice?, 
NEWSWEEK, May 14, 2012, at 28. 
 58. See Armacost, supra note 3, at 465–7l; Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits the Answer to 
Police Brutality?, in POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF 
FORCE 254–56 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996). 
 59. In 2011, for example, only forty-five law enforcement officers, including police officers, 
deputy sheriffs and state prison correctional officials, were charged by the Division. See CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET: 
CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION 19 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justifica 
tion/pdf/fy13-crt-justification.pdf [hereinafter PERFORMANCE BUDGET]. 
 60. See REAVES, supra note 42, at 2. 
 61. See PERFORMANCE BUDGET, supra note 59, at 5 (“The current Department-wide partial 
hiring freeze has impeded [the Civil Rights Division’s] ability to fill position vacancies and 
caused delays for securing exceptions.”). 
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the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office in 2008.62 Such investigations include a 
far-reaching inventory of departmental policies and procedures and interviews 
with departmental employees.63 The Maricopa County investigation stalled in 
2009 because the Sheriff’s Office refused to give the Department of Justice 
access to records necessary for the investigation.64 The Department of Justice 
sued for that access in 2010,65 and a negotiated resolution to that suit made the 
records available to Department of Justice lawyers, permitting the Department 
to continue investigating the office’s practices.66 Pursuant to that investigation, 
the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division issued a notice of findings in 
2011, which alleged widespread discrimination by the sheriff’s deputies.67 
Sheriff Arpaio promised cooperation with the Department of Justice, and in 
2012 the parties started negotiating towards a set of reform measures intended 
to end the pattern of constitutional violations.68 However, those negotiations 
broke down when Sheriff Arpaio publicly refused a key point of the settlement 
proposed by the Department of Justice, a court-appointed monitor to ensure 
compliance with the agreement.69 The Department of Justice filed suit in 
spring 2012.70 The complaint begins what is likely to be a long and expensive 
trial to prove the Department’s allegations against the Sheriff’s Office, and if 
the Department establishes a violation, additional proceedings or negotiations 
 
 62. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Att’y, 
Maricopa Cnty. 1–2 (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/docu 
ments/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf [hereinafter Perez Letter]. 
 63. Harmon, supra note 11, at 15. 
 64. Perez Letter, supra note 62, at 1, n.1 (explaining that the “investigation was delayed 
when MCSO repeatedly refused to provide the United States with access to pertinent material and 
personnel”); see also J.J. Hensley, Arpaio Won’t Cooperate with Federal Inquiry, 
AZCENTRAL.COM (July 8, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2009/07/08/ 
20090708mcsovdoj0708.html. 
 65. See generally Complaint, United States v. Maricopa County, No. 2:10-cv-01878-LOA 
(D. Ariz. Sept. 2, 2010); see also Marc Lacey, Justice Department Sues Sheriff Over Bias 
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2010, at A11; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Justice Department Files Lawsuit Against Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office For Refusing Full 
Cooperation With Title VI Investigation (Sept. 2, 2010) (on file with author). 
 66. See Perez Letter, supra note 62, at 1, n.1 (“The United States and MCSO eventually 
resolved this lawsuit in June 2011 after MCSO agreed to provide [the United States] with the 
information and access [it] had been seeking.”). 
 67. See Perez Letter, supra note 62, at 2. 
 68. See Jason Ryan, DOJ Breaks off Negotiations with Defiant Sheriff Joe Arpaio, ABC 
NEWS: LEGAL, (Apr. 3, 2012, 7:24 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/doj-
breaks-off-negotiations-with-defiant-sheriff-joe-arpaio/. 
 69. Associated Press, Arizona: Sheriff Is Accused of Bad-Faith Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 4, 2012, at A14. 
 70. See Complaint, United States v. Maricopa County, No. 2:12-cv-00981-LOA (D. Ariz. 
May 10, 2012); see also Fernando Santos & Charlie Savage, Lawsuit Says Sheriff Discriminated 
Against Latinos, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2012, at A18. 
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will be needed to specify reforms. The mandated reforms must then be 
implemented, and if experience provides a guide, that process could lead to 
years of continued litigation contesting compliance.71 
Given how difficult and complicated structural reform is, it is perhaps not 
surprising that no more than a few dozen police departments have been 
investigated in the nearly twenty years since the statute was passed.72 If federal 
efforts to enforce Section 14141 were doubled, trebled, or quadrupled, the 
Department of Justice could still likely investigate or sue no more than one or 
two dozen departments each year, a tiny fraction of the more than fifteen 
thousand local police departments and sheriff’s offices in the United States, 
many more of which are likely engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional 
action.73 Worse yet, federal efforts may well be Sisyphean; even as the 
Department of Justice investigates new departments for violating civil rights, 
some departments it previously investigated need revisiting.74 Thus, while 
Section 14141 remains an important tool for reforming problematic 
departments, without dramatic revisions to the ways in which it is enforced, it 
is unlikely that it can be imposed with sufficient frequency to change the 
calculus of reform for many police departments engaged in misconduct.75 
Civil suits under Section 1983 do not depend on government resources. As 
a result, they do not face the same limitations as criminal prosecutions or suits 
under Section 14141. But that also means that civil suits cannot be made more 
frequent by devoting more federal resources to them. Some factors routinely 
cited as limiting the frequency of civil suits presently—legal doctrines 
 
 71. See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, Extension Sought for Police Decree, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 
2006, at B3 (describing dispute over extending consent decree beyond its initial five year term); 
see also Lift the LAPD Consent Decree, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2009/may/24/opinion/ed-consent24 (explaining that initially, the department moved slowly to 
embrace the consent decree, and completing its requirements took longer than expected); Joel 
Rubin, U.S. Judge Ends Federal Oversight of the LAPD, L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2009), http://arti 
cles.latimes.com/2009/jul/18/local/me-consent-decree18 (reporting that the consent decree under 
which LAPD had been operating for eight years had finally been lifted, but that there were still 
outstanding issues including racial profiling and financial disclosures). 
 72. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., Special Litigation Section Cases and 
Matters, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/findsettle.php#policehttp://www.justice.gov/crt/ 
about/spl/findsettle.php#police (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (providing a list of law enforcement 
agencies the DOJ has investigated). 
 73. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 4. 
 74. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW 
ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_ 
report.pdf. For instance, a DOJ pattern or practice investigation of the New Orleans Police 
Department more than a decade ago noted that “some NOPD officers could not articulate proper 
legal standards for stops, searches, or arrests,” and the 2011 DOJ pattern or practice investigation 
noted that “NOPD still does not provide meaningful in-service training to officers on how to 
properly carry out stops, searches, and arrests.” Id. 
 75. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 22–23. 
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governing qualified immunity and municipal liability, practical difficulties in 
obtaining legal representation, and the obstacles to proving misconduct by law 
enforcement officers76—are unlikely to change. 
However, one trend may notably increase the frequency of civil suits and 
perhaps also criminal prosecutions: the spread of new technologies that 
increase the ability of plaintiffs and prosecutors to prove misconduct. In the 
last few years, privately-held video-recording devices, often in the form of 
cellular telephones, have become ubiquitous. At the same time, police 
departments have installed cameras in police cars, and as new devices become 
available and affordable, have provided officers with wearable video-recording 
devices.77 This dramatic increase in videotaping of police conduct, both by 
citizens and police departments themselves, enables prosecutors and plaintiffs 
to establish liability for some incidents that lack independent or credible 
witnesses. Because it facilitates cases that would otherwise be extremely 
difficult to bring, the additional videotaping is likely to deter some additional 
misconduct. Nevertheless, while videotape mitigates problems of proof, it does 
not eliminate them, and it does not mitigate the other obstacles to suit in 
criminal or civil cases.78 
As this discussion suggests, outside this small island of promise, none of 
the major remedies for police misconduct is likely to increase notably in the 
costs it imposes for acts of misconduct, in the frequency with which it is 
applied, or in the efficiency with which expected costs for misconduct translate 
into reform. Expanding resources and reforming federal remedies may achieve 
marginal improvements, but the structural, doctrinal, and practical obstacles to 
increasing the deterrent effect of the federal exclusionary rule, criminal civil 
rights prosecutions, civil suits, and suits for equitable relief are notable and 
likely persistent. As a result, while these remedies may be used to influence 
some additional departments to adopt promising remedial measures, they are 
unlikely to drive significant national reform. 
 
 76. See Aramcost, supra note 3, at 467–71. 
 77. See TASER Ships Axon Flex On-Body Cameras, POLICE (May 24, 2012), http://www.po 
licemag.com/Channel/Technology/News/2012/05/24/TASER-Ships-Axon-Flex-On-Body-Camer 
as.aspx?ref=OnTarget-Thursday-20120524&utm_source=Email&utm_medium=Enewsletter 
(noting that the new second-generation digital video recorder camera weighs only fifteen grams, 
can be mounted on a collar, cap, helmet, or eyeglasses, and is being adopted immediately by 
several major police departments). 
 78. Part II argues that raising monetary damages under Section 1983 might not produce 
commensurate reform because police chiefs will not internalize most of those additional costs. 
See supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text. The same problem extends to raising the expected 
costs of civil suits by increasing the frequency of suits. The resulting expected costs for 
municipalities are similarly difficult to translate into costs for the actors who could most easily 
prevent future violations. 
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Furthermore, even if many of these obstacles could be overcome, and 
federal remedies could be used to impose substantial additional costs on police 
departments that engage in unconstitutional conduct, federal efforts would still 
fail to produce the kind of officer conduct many advocates seek. All of these 
major federal remedies suffer the same well-known defect for those interested 
in shaping police conduct: they exclusively target constitutional violations. 
While constitutional law prohibits many kinds of serious misconduct, many 
avoidable, but necessary-in-the-moment uses of force; retaliatory arrests for 
trivial offenses; and lies told by police officers to citizens and courts do not 
violate the Constitution; and, therefore, cannot be deterred by federal remedies. 
At best, discouraging constitutional violations using federal remedies will 
secondarily improve police conduct more generally by improving 
accountability and increasing professionalism. The exclusionary rule seems to 
have had that effect.79 But depending on constitutional remedies to fix non-
constitutional misconduct seems a crooked path to important goals for 
American policing. 
IV.  THE LIMITS OF OTHER MEANS OF RAISING THE COSTS OF MISCONDUCT 
Federal remedies remain significant in spite of these limits. They already 
incentivize some reform, they have purposes other than deterrence, and they 
can be improved somewhat to deter misconduct further. Nevertheless, those 
interested in broader reform must look further. 
To some degree, looking further means exploring underutilized or new 
federal means of increasing the costs of misconduct for departments. For 
example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196480 and the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 196881 prohibit law enforcement agencies 
receiving federal funds, training, or technical assistance from discriminating on 
the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion. Since police 
departments receive substantial federal assistance,82 these statutes could be 
used to induce remedial measures designed to prevent discrimination of 
individuals by police officers. One could also imagine new analogous statutes 
that condition federal funds for police departments on abstaining from forms of 
misconduct other than discrimination. 
Presently, Title VI is not used to its full deterrent potential. Existing 
federal regulations limit the statute’s use to induce reform because they specify 
 
 79. See Walker, supra note 14, at 29–31. 
 80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d7 (2006). 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 3789d (2006). 
 82. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET: OFFICE OF 
JUSTICE PROGRAMS 8 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/pdf/fy 
13-ojp-justification.pdf (indicating that federal grants to state and local law enforcement total 
more than one billion dollars). 
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that the Department of Justice should enforce Title VI only to “secure prompt 
and full compliance so that needed [f]ederal assistance may commence or 
continue” and dictate enforcement strategies designed to minimize the statute’s 
impact on funding.83 As a result, while Title VI is sometimes used in 
conjunction with Section 14141, it is rarely used with notable effect against 
police departments.84 Even if there were no regulations that restricted its 
enforcement, Title VI, and any new federal remedies based on it, would likely 
suffer from some of the same obstacles that presently limit the frequency of 
Section 14141 suits: discrimination in violation of federal law is expensive to 
investigate and difficult to prove. 
V.  EXPLORING AN ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM OF REFORM: CHANGING THE 
EXPECTED COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REFORM 
The federal government likely plays an ineliminable role in regulating the 
police. State and local actors face strong majoritarian interests in crime control 
and powerful special interests in law enforcement that may inhibit reaching a 
good balance between police effectiveness and civil rights.85 Perhaps for this 
reason, state and local legal remedies for police misconduct have long been 
weaker than their federal counterparts. But federal remedies are close to the 
practical limits of their ability to raise the expected costs of misconduct for 
police departments. For this reason, it is worth considering whether federal 
efforts should target the other side of the equation for police departments: the 
costs and benefits of the remedial measures likely to reduce misconduct. While 
existing remedies induce reform by making misconduct costly, federal 
resources can also be used to lower the costs and increase the benefits of 
institutional reform. Rather than continue to look for ways to make misconduct 
unappealing relative to reform, it may be time to consider ways to make reform 
more appealing relative to misconduct. 
As I have pointed out elsewhere, the Department of Justice already 
facilitates reform by lowering its information costs.86 For example, the 
Department has funded reports intended to show police leadership how to 
 
 83. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.3(a) (2011) (Guidelines for the enforcement of Title VI, Civil Rights 
Act of 1964). 
 84. For an example of a recent use of Title VI in conjunction with Section 14141, see Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Office of Pub. Affairs, Department of Justice Files Lawsuit in 
Arizona Against Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and Sheriff Joseph Arpaio (May 10, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/May/12-crt-602.html. 
 85. See Harmon, supra note 4, at 811–16. 
 86. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 48–49, 56–57; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE 
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, Mission and Vision, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/about/mission.htm (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2013) (stating that OJP seeks to “provid[e] and coordinat[e] information, research 
and development, statistics, training, and support to help the justice community build the capacity 
it needs to meet its public safety goals”). 
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adopt computerized early intervention systems and how to conduct internal 
affairs investigations in small departments.87 But those efforts have been 
limited.88 The Department of Justice could work more aggressively and 
strategically to promote research on the causes of misconduct and the 
effectiveness of reforms, disseminate information and model policies on 
promising reforms, and provide technical assistance to departments seeking to 
adopt them. In this way, the Department of Justice could further lower the 
information barriers to reform. 
Although some gains may be available by increasing research, training, 
and technical assistance by the Department of Justice, the information costs of 
policing reform are relatively small and bounded. Departments considering 
adopting and maintaining remedial measures as a means to lower the costs of 
misconduct likely face much greater infrastructure, personnel, and training 
costs than information costs. The Department of Justice already subsidizes 
reform, for example, by providing grants to local departments to encourage 
specific remedial measures. Thus, the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services has given tens of millions of dollars in grants to state and local police 
agencies for the purchase of in-car video cameras that can be used to improve 
training and accountability for officers.89 But, overwhelmingly, the Department 
of Justice’s grants to police departments serve purposes other than promoting 
civil rights.90 One could imagine a much stronger federal grant program 
designed to subsidize cost-effective remedial measures for preventing key 
forms of misconduct. 
I have also argued elsewhere that the Department of Justice could increase 
the benefits of reform for police departments by, for example, introducing a 
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safe harbor from suit under Section 14141 for police departments that commit 
themselves to adopt a preset array of reform measures specified by the 
Department of Justice and make verifiable progress toward their 
implementation.91 Such a program would require a significant change in the 
Department of Justice’s Section 14141 enforcement program and an effective 
monitoring scheme. But by providing immediate rewards for departments that 
adopt such reforms, it could also open a significant new avenue for changing 
the calculus of misconduct and reform for police departments, something 
existing federal remedies cannot offer.92 
Federal resources could also be used to increase the reputational and 
professional benefits for chiefs who adopt reform efforts. Accreditation 
provides reputational benefits to departments and chiefs that satisfy specific 
administrative and operational standards, and it could be a mechanism for 
further identifying and rewarding reform efforts.93 The Department of Justice 
could also increase professional benefits for civil rights initiatives informally, 
by holding prestigious invitation-only conferences for police chiefs with 
reputations as reformers. Since the possibilities of inducing reform by reducing 
its costs and increasing its benefits have not been adequately explored, there 
may be many other creative and cost-effective means of encouraging chiefs 
and municipalities to adopt reforms. These suggestions are merely the 
beginning. 
This approach to reducing police misconduct is not without risk. In order 
to lower the cost of reform or raise its benefits, the federal government must be 
able to evaluate police department efforts. Those efforts can be measured 
either by their impact on misconduct outcomes or by departmental progress in 
implementing specific reforms. Unfortunately, both means of evaluating 
departmental efforts are problematic. Presently, there exist only crude outcome 
measures for misconduct, and little data to support them.94 Without better 
measures, it would be hard to compare the success of police department reform 
efforts. If instead the Department of Justice rewards implementing particular 
remedial measures without reference to outcomes, the cost-effectiveness of 
federal efforts to incentivize reform will depend heavily on the Department’s 
success in endorsing cost-effective remedial measures. If the Department of 
Justice chooses ineffectual reforms, the federal government and municipalities 
 
 91. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 36–42. 
 92. See id. at 37–38. 
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 94. Id. at 5. 
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could spend valuable resources and receive little benefit or even undermine 
other law enforcement goals.95 Yet, without additional data, the Department of 
Justice will also have difficulty evaluating competing reforms or the distorting 
effect such reforms could have on policing more broadly. Thus, collecting 
national data is an essential precondition for federal efforts to lower the costs 
and increase the rewards of reform as a means to reduce misconduct.96 Even 
with such data, there are no guarantees that federal monies used to induce 
reform will be well spent. 
Despite such risks, advocates, scholars, and policymakers should devote 
new energy to exploring federal means of lowering the costs and increasing the 
benefits of reform. The law, politics, and practicalities that circumscribe 
existing federal remedies mean that additional efforts to refine those remedies 
are likely to achieve only marginal gains in deterring misconduct. Against this 
backdrop, this untapped resource for inducing national reform promises more 
hope than danger. 
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